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The redistributive and efficiency aspects of personal taxes are of particular interest to 
both economists and governments designing tax reforms. Traditionally however, the 
numerous analytical tools available to calculate distributional and efficiency effects of 
taxes and transfers are not widely used in tax policy advice. This partly reflects the 
computational complexities involved in calculating some of those measures and the 
need for simplicity, and transparency of underlying assumptions, when presenting 
policy advice. This paper makes two contributions to the analysis of the equity and 
efficiency effects of tax policy. Firstly, it applies the methodologies proposed by 
economists to measure equity and efficiency outcomes of taxes to provide some 
evidence for the New Zealand income tax and transfer system. This makes use of 
Treasury’s microsimulation model, TaxWell. Secondly, the paper examines a database 
of low-income New Zealand taxpayers. A decomposition by individual and household 
characteristics shows that different groups of low income taxpayers can be affected 
quite differently by various aspects of the tax/transfer system. In particular, tax-free 
zones do not appear to be well targeted to help those most in need. 
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Equity and Efficiency Measures 
of Tax-Transfer Systems: Some 
Evidence for New Zealand 
Introduction 
The distributional consequences of tax reform are frequently prominent in policy 
debates in New Zealand. As an example, in advance of the 2008 Budget, the then 
(Labour) Finance Minister required that his proposed Budget tax reform meet an 
‘inequality test’, namely that the reform should not worsen current inequality.
1
 
However, the precise interpretation given to ‘inequality’ also raises complex issues. 
In addition, in evaluating a tax reform, inequality is just one of the criteria which may 
be applied. It is also necessary to consider the consequences for efficiency in order 
to ensure that redistributive aims are achieved at minimum acceptable costs. 
Concepts of both efficiency and equity are therefore central to analyses of taxation 
reform. A variety of previous studies have attempted to measure the efficiency and 
redistributive properties of actual and hypothetical reforms in New Zealand.
2
 
Furthermore, the New Zealand Treasury maintains a tax microsimulation model 
constructed to examine the effects on individuals and households of the direct tax 
system. The evaluation of tax policies is complicated by the fact that they frequently 
involve both losers and winners, and any judgements cannot avoid subjective ‘value 
judgements’ regarding the weight attached to changes affecting different groups in 
society. Economic analysis can make a valuable contribution to policy debate and 
decision making by examining and presenting the consequences, in as succinct a 
form as possible, of adopting a range of clearly stated value judgements. 
                                                  
1
   The tax cut package included in the 2008 Budget was required to satisfy four ‘tests’ of which the 
‘inequality test’ was one. The others were: no increase in government borrowing; no reductions in 
public services; and no worsening of inflationary pressures. 
2
   Research within the New Zealand Treasury has examined various aspects of the distribution of 
incomes and the efficiency/distributional properties of the tax system in New Zealand. See, for 
example, Creedy (2003a, b) Creedy and van der Ven (2003), Creedy and Sleeman (2004), Hyslop 
and Mare (2001), Kalb and Scutella (2003). Some years ago Treasury also developed a behavioural 
microsimulation model of labour supply in New Zealand to help analyse personal tax & transfer 
reform but the model has been little used for policy advice. For recently released assessments of the 
equity-efficiency properties of the current, and Budget 2008 proposed, NZ personal tax system; see 
 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/budget/2008.   
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This paper examines summary measures of the distributional and efficiency 
properties of the New Zealand personal income tax and transfer system in order to 
shed some light on the trade-offs involved. Section 2 discusses some of the 
measurement issues involved and the way value judgements can be specified in the 
context of an ‘evaluation function’. Section 3 briefly summarises some inequality 
indices and tax ‘efficiency’ measures. Section 4 examines some indices of inequality 
for pre- and post-tax-and-transfer incomes in New Zealand using the Treasury tax 
microsimulation model, TaxWell, applied to 2006-07 Household Expenditure Survey 
(HES) data.
3
 This section also considers sensitivity to the income units used: 
individual incomes, household incomes and adult-equivalent household incomes.  
Section 5 compares the inequality outcomes for a number of policy scenarios 
including alternative tax reforms designed to be approximately revenue-neutral. In 
the absence of a full behavioural model, we are unable to construct ‘welfare’ 
measures such as excess burdens of taxes and transfers, but section 6 provides 
some clues to possible equity-efficiency trade-offs by examining effective tax rates 
facing different taxpayers. Section 7 focuses on data for low-income earners, arguing 
that at least in New Zealand, using the tax system to redistribute towards individuals 
with low taxable income would represent poor targeting of social assistance. Section 
8 concludes. 
The Evaluation of Tax Reforms 
Economists have found it useful to represent the variety of ways in which different 
‘judges’ may evaluate a tax reform using the concept of a social evaluation function, 
or social welfare function. Despite its name, this makes no attempt to measure the 
wellbeing of society, but provides a way of determining whether any specified policy 
change would be considered as an improvement by an individual judge. It 
summarises in a succinct and convenient way the overall result of complex changes 
which may affect many different types of individual and household. Economists have 
developed methods to deal with a range of value judgements, but it cannot be 
expected that any single analysis would cover all possible points of view. In 
particular, one broad value judgement is that the overall evaluation depends on the 
outcomes for each individual in society – each person counts, but the importance 
attached to changes may not be the same for everyone (for example, depending on 
their income or wealth, or other circumstances considered relevant).  
A general form of social welfare function, W, may thus be written as depending on 
some measure, say z, for each of the N persons in society. This involves a value 
judgement that the relevant unit of analysis is the individual.
4
 Hence: 
                                                  
3
   The Treasury developed the TaxWell microsimulation model to model the impact of taxes and 
benefits on individual disposable income, for costing and analysis purposes. All attempts have been 
made to ensure the accuracy of the model and the information used, although some errors may 
remain. 
4
   Other properties which reflect value judgements, in addition to the individualistic nature of the 
welfare function, relate to additive and Paretean characteristics, and adherence to the ‘principle of 
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  ) ,..., ( 1 N z z W W =          ( 1 )  
A further value judgement concerns the precise way in which z, referred to as the 
‘welfare metric’, is measured and this cannot avoid value judgements as well as 
creating measurement problems. Alternative welfare metrics involve the use of some 
measure of income, or consumption, or a measure of ‘money metric utility’ which 
allows for the value attached to leisure. Questions also arise over the time period 
chosen, that is whether the welfare metric covers weekly or annual values, which are 
complicated by the existence of short term variations (temporary sickness or 
unemployment), or those measured over much longer periods, where allowance can 
be made for systematic life cycle variations. 
In considering the welfare metric, it is common to allow for the existence of income 
sharing, particularly within households where there may also be economies of scale. 
This involves the use of adult equivalence scales, which also require value 
judgements to be specified; these are discussed further below. In the following 
analysis it is not possible to allow for the value of leisure and the welfare metric is 
measured in terms of income per adult equivalent person.  
Taxes, Redistribution and Efficiency 
A number of measures of income inequality and of the redistributional impact of 
income taxes and social transfers are available. Since one of our objectives is to 
highlight the role of value judgements in reaching inequality conclusions we report 
the familiar Gini and Atkinson inequality indices, using a variety of ‘inequality 
aversion’ assumptions for the Atkinson index, A.
5
 In considering the redistributive 
impact of income taxes and social transfers (such as Working for Families), we 
consider how these measures change for different definitions of pre-tax, post-tax and 
post-tax-and-transfer income, in addition to Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky 
measures of tax progressivity. The next subsection summarises those measures. 
                                                                                                                                         
transfers’, whereby welfare is judged to increase if a transfer takes place from rich to poor without 
affecting their rankings. 
5
   Similar assumptions underlie the Extended Gini index, G(v), where the parameter v describes 
differing value judgements relating to inequality aversion similar to Atkinson’s ε (where v-1 is 
analogous, but not equivalent, to ε; see Creedy 1996, pp.20-21). The extended Gini is defined as 
follows (where  v = 2 is the standard Gini): 1 )} ( 1 ( , { ) / ( ) ( − − − = v y F y Cov y v v G .   
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Measures of Inequality and Redistribution 
The Gini index of pre-tax income, y, Gy, is the familiar measure of the area contained 
between the Lorenz curve for y and the line of perfect equality (the 45
o line). The 
Lorenz curve describes the relationship between the cumulative proportion of 
individuals, N, (or other income unit) and the cumulative proportion of incomes, F(y), 
where individuals are ranked in ascending order of their incomes. Formally Gy can be 
defined as: 
  )) ( 1 ( , { ) / 2 ( i i y y F y Cov y G − =        ( 2 )  
where F(yi) is the proportion of people with incomes below yi, and  y  is mean income. 








































      ( 3 )  
The Gini measure can in fact be derived from a special kind of social welfare, or 
evaluation, function in which welfare is viewed in terms of ‘unfairness’. If welfare is 
defined as the average of the minimum income from all pairwise income 
comparisons, it is possible to show that the welfare function is equivalent to: 
  } 1 { y G G y W − =          ( 4 )  
This type of expression for the evaluation function involves two summary measures 
of the distribution, the arithmetic mean and the Gini coefficient. It is a convenient 
‘compression’ of the form involving all individual values of income, and is referred to 
as an ‘abbreviated’ welfare function. In particular, it allows the implications for the 




The Atkinson measure of inequality is instead based on a ‘wastefulness’  judgement 
regarding inequality, whereby a more equal distribution of the same total income 
could produce an improvement, from the point of view of the judge, and hence a 
















   ε ≠  1        ( 5 )  
where ε reflects the relative inequality aversion of the judge (reflecting the concavity 
of the welfare function). Increases in higher incomes are given a relatively lower 
weight than for lower incomes. The Atkinson index relies on the concept of an 
                                                  
6
   The connection between the Gini and the Lorenz curve can be seen from (3). The Gini equals 1 
minus twice the area beneath the Lorenz curve. It can be seen that, for large N, the term in square 
brackets ≈ 1 and the terms ((N+1- i)/N) and  ∑i i i y y / respectively measure i’s proportion of the 
population and of total income. 
7
   For more details on abbreviated functions, see Creedy (1996, p.25-28).   
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equally-distributed equivalent value of total income, ye , which yields the same social 
welfare as the current distribution. This is given by: 
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exp     1 = ε        ( 7 )  
  The Atkinson index, A(ε), is the proportional difference between arithmetic mean 
income and the equally distributed equivalent: 
  ) / y e (y - 1   ) A( = ε   1 ) ( 0 < < ε A   where       ( 8 )  
Values of ε close to zero imply a mild aversion to inequality, and thus a low 
preference to redistribute towards the bottom of the income distribution. That is, only 
a small sacrifice in total incomes would be tolerated in order to achieve income 
equality. A value of ε greater than 1 implies a stronger aversion to inequality (i.e. a 
willingness to sacrifice a large fraction of income in the redistributive process). 
To illustrate, HES data used in section 2 show that average gross taxable income in 
New Zealand in 2006-07 was $33,503. Using the individual incomes within the HES, 
and a value of ε = 0.5 to calculate ye yields ye = $27,153. That is, ε = 0.5 represents a 
significant degree of inequality aversion - a willingness to sacrifice around 20% of 
total income in order to achieve full equality. A value of ε = 0.2 implies a much lower 
willingness to sacrifice income (8%), while ε = 1.0 implies a 40% sacrifice. In effect 
the value of A(ε) captures the proportionate reduction in mean income that the value 
of ε implies; hence A(ε) = 0.2 implies a 20% income sacrifice to achieve equality. 
This is approximately achieved here with ε = 0.5. 
The rearrangement of (8) shows that the social welfare function associated with the 
Atkinson measure can also be expressed in abbreviated form as: 
  )} ( 1 {
' ε A y y W e A − = =         ( 9 )  
Hence the abbreviated functions using the Gini and Atkinson measures are very 
similar, despite the fact that they are based on quite different value judgements. In 
each case they imply that, in terms of the trade-off between equity and efficiency, a 1 
per cent increase in equality,  I − 1  (where  ) ( ), ( ε A v G I = ), would be traded for a 1 
per cent reduction in arithmetic mean income. Alternatively, a 1 per cent increase in 
total income would be just sufficient to compensate for a 1 per cent increase in 
inequality (as measured by the relevant index).  
The Gini and Atkinson indices can be compared for alternative definitions of pre-tax, 
post-tax, or post-tax-and-transfer, incomes where in the case of the Gini, individuals 
are ranked according the value of the income measure under consideration. However 
for some comparisons it is useful to rank individuals according to their pre-tax 
incomes even when considering a post-tax income definition. This gives rise to the 
Concentration index, C, such that if y and z are respectively pre- and post-tax 
incomes then Gz is the Gini measure of post-tax incomes (ranked by z) while Cz is   
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the concentration measure, which takes essentially the same form as the Gini except 
that individuals are ranked by their pre-tax incomes. 
Using these definitions, the Reynolds-Smolensky, L, and Kakwani, K, measures of 
the redistributive effect of a tax can be defined. This requires a Concentration index 
of income tax payments, Ct, which measures the extent of inequality in individuals’ 
tax payments, ranked by their pre-tax incomes. Thus, tax progressivity is measured 
by: 
  z y G G L − =    (10) 
  y t G C K − =    (11) 
The Reynolds-Smolensky index captures the difference in the Ginis of pre- and post-
tax incomes, while the Kakwani index measures the disproportionality of tax 
payments relative to pre-tax incomes. With a proportional tax, the two K components, 
Ct and Gy, are the same (the Concentration and Lorenz curves coincide) so that K = 
0. Thus, with a tax/transfer system that is progressive at all income levels, the 
concentration curve of tax payments lies outside (that is, further from the 45
o line 
than) the Lorenz curve of pre-tax incomes. Progressive taxes yield 0 ≤ K, L ≤ 1. 
Kakwani (1977) shows that K and L differ depending on the extent of re-ranking of 
individuals between pre- and post-tax incomes and the aggregate ratio of tax 
payments to incomes, such that: 










where g is the aggregate tax ratio and P is an index of re-ranking given by: 
  z z C G P − =  (13) 
In the absence of any re-ranking K and L are proportional, with L deviating from K 
depending on the size of the aggregate tax take. As a result, tax reforms that are not 
revenue-neutral can yield changes in K and L that are not proportional. 
Measures of Efficiency and Welfare 
In the process of raising revenue and redistributing income, taxes generate 
distortions to behaviour which mean that the full economic cost of raising an 
additional dollar of tax revenue is greater than a dollar.  This can be measured by the 
marginal cost of funds (MCF), or deadweight loss (DWL), or excess burden of tax 
concepts. Finding empirical measures of these concepts for income taxes and 
transfers is not straightforward however, and typically requires a variety of 
assumptions about individuals’ behaviour and/or application of microsimulation 
modelling techniques.
8
 The New Zealand Treasury (NZT) does not currently have 
                                                  
8
   See Diewert and Lawrence (1996, 2001) and Creedy and Sleeman (2004) for applications of the 
DWL approach to New Zealand taxes, and Creedy and Kalb (2006) for discussion of microsimulation 
modelling applied to taxes in Australia.   
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such a model and hence must assess the efficiency and welfare impacts of taxes 
using simpler methods. 
Key components of such modelling are methods to account for the fact that different 
individuals may have differing preferences and face different, non-linear budget 
constraints that influence their labour supply and other responses to income taxation.  
These cannot readily be factored into tax policy evaluations without a fully specified 
model. However the existing literature provides a number of guiding principles.  
Firstly, an approximation for the excess burden for a linear income tax is proportional 
to the square of the marginal tax rate.
9
 The New Zealand tax system is much more 
complex than the simple linear case, with several tax thresholds and rates, giving rise 
to a piecewise-linear budget constraint. Also, means-tested transfer payments such 
as Working for Families, WfF, lead to non-convexities in the budget set. However, the 
simple ‘square of the tax rate’ approximation points to the need to recognise that the 
efficiency losses associated with increases in marginal tax rates are non-
proportional. Secondly, the labour supply literature has identified a number of groups 
that might be expected to be especially responsive or unresponsive to changes in 
effective tax rates. Thirdly the literature on tax avoidance responses by taxpayers 
also points to some key margins likely to give rise to efficiency losses, such as 
divergences between the relevant personal and corporate tax rates or the impacts of 
progressive personal income tax scales on income splitting among taxpayers. 
Since the abbreviated welfare function includes both the average income level and 
the degree of equality (one minus the degree of inequality), it can be used to provide 
a simple comparison of different tax structures, as captured by their impacts on mean 
incomes (efficiency) and on equality. For example, a tax change that involves an 
increase in inequality (either the Gini or the Atkinson index) from 0.2 to 0.25, implies 
a proportionate change in equality of (0.75 – 0.8)/0.8 = -0.0625. As a result, for social 
welfare, W, to improve, the tax change must also be associated with an improvement 
in mean incomes of at least 6.25 per cent. If efficiency gains are unable to generate 
such an improvement, the tax policy would be evaluated as harming social welfare. 
This evaluation depends on the inequality measure used and, in the case of the 
Atkinson index, the aversion to inequality, ε, and hence cannot be made without first 
specifying the relevant value judgement. 
The abbreviated social welfare function can also be used to measure the ‘welfare 
premium’ associated with a particular tax or tax change. The welfare premium is the 
welfare in excess of that arising from a (hypothetical) proportional tax which raises 
the same revenue. In the present context, with a tax and transfer system in place, we 
can think of the proportional system as applying to taxes plus transfers. That is, the 
welfare premium compares the welfare of the current tax-transfer system with one in 
which current tax revenue net of transfers is distributed in proportion to pre-tax-and-
                                                  
9
    See, for example, Auerbach (1985), Creedy (2004). On welfare changes with highly nonlinear 
budget constraints, see Creedy and Kalb (2006).   
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transfer income. Lambert (1993) showed that the welfare premium, Π, can be 
measured as: 
  ) ( ) 1 ( z y I I y g − − = Π  (14) 
Or, normalising by mean income: 
  ) )( 1 ( / z y I I g y − − = Π = π  (15) 
where I is the chosen inequality index, such as the Gini or Atkinson measure, that is 
compatible with the abbreviated social welfare function. However, this exercise also 
assumes that mean income is unaffected by the fiscal changes. 
One issue for policy advice emerging from the above concerns the question of 
whether the methods of generating social welfare changes in association with tax 
changes, such as those derived from microsimulation models, provide a suitably 
transparent and reliable method of evaluating reform. Given the need to value leisure 
and model labour supply and other responses, specify utility and social welfare 
functions, and make inequality aversion judgements, such methods can appear to 
policy-makers as too opaque or unreliable. An alternative approach would be to seek 
to measure efficiency aspects, for example via excess burden approximations, and 
inequality aspects of tax reforms separately, but which identify the trade-offs and 
value judgements required for policy choices. 
For example, Figure 1 shows a trade-off between efficiency and inequality outcomes 
of two alternative hypothetical policies compared to the status quo, for differing 
inequality aversion judgements (represented by Index1 and Index2). For such 
comparisons to be useful requires a suitably comprehensive efficiency measure and 
an inequality measure that is not too sensitive to the particular choice of index.  











In Figure 1, Policy 1 could involve a reduction in a top marginal rate that improves 
efficiency but at the cost of reduced equality (relative to the status quo; the size of the 
reduction depending on inequality aversion). Policy 2 - such as an increase in a 
social welfare transfer – could involve the opposite choice – improved equality and 




Index 1  Index 2
Policy 2 
Index 1 Index 2  
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worsened efficiency. The impact of inequality aversion on the equality outcomes, 
captured by Indices 1 and 2, need not be the same for both policy options. 
Income Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in 
New Zealand 
To examine the redistributional impact of taxes and transfers in New Zealand 
requires inequality measures of pre- and post-tax, and pre- and post-transfer, 
incomes. This, in turn, requires a suitable income measure. We use the income data 
available from the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) analysed using Treasury’s 
microsimulation model, TaxWell. This is a non-behavioural model, and hence 
conclusions must be treated cautiously. Nevertheless it provides some information on 
the likely impact effects (sometimes referred to as ‘static’ effects) of tax-transfer 
policy. Results presented below are based on the 2006-07 HES sample of around 
2550 households which have then been scaled up using Statistics New Zealand 
weights to represent the New Zealand population as a whole. 
HES income data can be decomposed into taxable and non-taxable incomes, which 
may be ‘private/personal’ (such as earned/unearned incomes) or ‘public’ transfers 
from government; see Table 1. Important for present purposes is the distinction 
between taxable and non-taxable government transfers, where the latter affect total 
income but do not interact directly with the tax system. In considering the 
distributional impact of alternative tax and transfer policies governments could trade-
off changes in taxable and/or non-taxable transfers and/or income taxes. 




Taxable  I.  Personal income 
(e.g. wages/salaries; capital income)
II.  Govt benefits 
(e.g. unemployment benefit; 
superannuation) 
Non-taxable  III. Some unearned income 
(e.g. lottery winnings) 
IV.  Govt transfers 
(e.g. WfF, Accom. supplement) 
The analysis begins by comparing the distribution of private (earned plus unearned) 
income with the distribution of gross taxable income (GTI) where the latter is private 
taxable income plus taxable benefits.
10
 To avoid confusion, the term ‘benefits’ is used 
to refer to taxable transfers from government (a component of GTI) and ‘transfers’ is 
used to refer to non-taxable transfers such as Working for Families and 
Accommodation Supplement. 
                                                  
10
  The HES incomes examined here relate to individuals 15 years and over.   
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For most of the analyses below the distribution of GTI is treated as the base income 
definition against which the distributional impacts of tax and transfer changes are 
compared. Thus taxes are first deducted from GTI, and then non-taxable transfers 
are added, to yield distributions of post-tax, and post-tax-and-transfer, incomes. In 
considering the distributional aspect of the social welfare system, the analysis 
therefore does not generally examine the benefit system though this can readily be 
done. 
One reason for this choice relates to the assumption, implicit in all the comparisons 
below, that the distribution of pre-tax-and-transfer income is unaffected by these 
government interventions. This is a questionable assumption but is especially 
inappropriate for incomes prior to the receipt of government benefits such as 
pensions. For example, in the absence of a government pension and benefit system, 
the level and distribution of private income could be expected to be very different. 
However, this means that in considering hypothetical policy trade-offs which maintain 
constant inequality, these trade-offs do not include benefit changes. 
The Distribution of Pre-Tax Incomes 
There are number of possible income distributions we could consider, such as for 
earned income only, wage and salary income only, and all income excluding benefits. 
Similarly there are various alternative units of analysis, such as all individuals, 
individuals in the labour market, households, or families. We begin by considering 
only private/personal taxable income, PGTI, (quadrant I in Table 1) and gross taxable 
income, GTI, (quadrants I & II) for individuals, both including and excluding those 
with zero incomes.
11
 Figure 2 shows the distribution of GTI including zero incomes, 
and Table 2 shows Gini and Atkinson indices for the various definitions. The Atkinson 
index necessarily includes only positive incomes.
12
 
Figure 2 shows the large number of individuals on zero income (around 340k out of a 
total of around 3.2 million individuals in the distribution). These are largely 15-18 year 
olds, students and non-workers within households. There is a second mode of 
around 140k individuals at $13k. Thereafter the number of individuals drops so that 
there are generally around 10-20k individuals in each $1000 class between $20k and 






                                                  
11
  Some HES individuals are recorded with negative income (e.g. non-earners with a taxable loss from 
property); these are treated as zero taxable incomes for present purposes. 
12
  This distribution is similar to the bimodal distributions examined by Bakker and Creedy (1999). 
13
  The spikes at the lower end of the distribution are associated with level of superannuation and 
various benefit levels. Unlike income distribution data based on IRD records, this distribution does not 
reveal especially large spikes at the $38k and $60k tax thresholds due to the small sample size; see 
IRD (2005; p.33) at:  http:// www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/bim2005.pdf .   
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Table 2 treats the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis. However, concern 
may be with the inequality of income over all individuals, including those who may 
have zero income or small amounts of unearned income, despite the possibility that 
they live within high income households. 
Table 2 – Gini and Atkinson Indices for GTI and PGTI 
  Gini   Atkinson  (ε) 
  incl. zero inc  excl. zero inc    (0.2) (0.5) (0.8) (1.0) (1.5) 
PGTI  0.608  0.569   0.094 0.242 0.407 0.532 0.865 
GTI  0.512  0.464   0.077 0.190 0.305 0.392 0.730 
 
The table shows Ginis in this case to be: GPGTI = 0.608 and GGTI = 0.512. That is, 
before receipt of government benefits, income is relatively unequally distributed 
(recall 0 ≤ G ≤ 1; with G = 0 implying complete equality). Unsurprisingly, the inclusion 
of benefits reduces the inequality of taxable incomes by around 0.1, or 15 per cent 
((0.608 – 0.512)/0.608). When those on zero incomes are excluded, both Ginis are 
reduced: to GPGTI = 0.569 and GGTI = 0.464. 
Table 2 also highlights the differences in the Atkinson measures depending on 
assumed inequality aversion. This indicates that, given the current distribution of 
income across individuals, and mild inequality aversion at ε = 0.2, A(ε) = 0.077 is 
obtained for GTI; that is a 7.7 per cent reduction in mean income would be tolerated 
to achieve complete equality. For greater degrees of inequality aversion of ε = 0.5 
and 0.8, the inequality index rises substantially to 0.24 and 0.41 respectively. These 
results suggest that, given the relatively large numbers of individuals on low incomes 
in New Zealand, even relatively moderate aversion to inequality, such as ε around   
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0.5, generates a relatively high value of A involving a relatively large drop in mean 
incomes. 
Whether individuals on zero or low incomes are of concern in welfare terms may 
depend on the choice of unit of analysis.
14
 The way in which inequality indices vary 
depending on this classification is examined below. 
The New Zealand Personal Tax and Transfer System, 
2006-07 
Before examining the redistributive impact of New Zealand taxes and transfers we 
summarise the key aspects of that system in 2006-07, the year for which we examine 
HES data. Personal ‘taxable’ incomes were subject to tax rates of 0.195, 0.33 and 
0.39 above income thresholds of $0, $38k and $60k per year. That is, income is 
taxable from the first dollar received, with no initial tax-free zone as in Australia and 
most other OECD countries. However, for incomes below $38k there was a ‘low 
income rebate’ (LIR) which effectively reduces the individual’s marginal tax rate to 




The main non-taxable transfer is Working for Families, WfF, which is composed of a 
number of family-related tax credits.
16
 The largest credit in revenue terms is the 
Family Tax Credit (FTC) which pays a fixed amount per child depending on the 
number and age of children in the family and the size of total family taxable income. 
In addition an In-Work Tax Credit (IWTC) is paid to families provided one member of 
the family works 20 hours per week or more (or two family members work 30+ hours 
per week). In 2006-07 the FTC was around $3,700-4,400 per year for the first child 
(depending on age) and around $2,400-3,900 for a second and subsequent child 
(depending on age). IWTC also depends on the number of children in the family and 
was around $3,100 per year when there are 1-3 children with additional payments for 
extra children. For family incomes above $35,000, the FTC and IWTC abate at a rate 
of 20cents per dollar of additional family income. As a result, effective marginal tax 




                                                  
14
  Households and families differ in the HES dataset. A household represents a group of individuals 
residing together. For example, a single household composed of two adults and two students is 
considered a single family if the students are the children/dependents of the adults but would be 
three families if the students are independent of the adults and each other. 
15
  The LIR is worth 4 cents per dollar of earned income up to $9.5k but then abates at 1.5cents per 
dollar to $38k. Wages, salaries and self-employment incomes are also subject to an accident 
compensation (ACC) levy of 1.3 per cent. The LIR was removed a part of the Budget 2008 reforms. 
16
  In addition there is a Minimum FTC that guarantees a minimum net income for sole parents working 
more than 20 hours per week (couples working more than 30 hours). Other non-taxable transfers 
include the housing-related transfer, Accommodation Supplement. This is based on housing costs 
and depends on family income and area of residence. 
17
  WfF is abated against the primary earner’s income first, and then, if necessary, against the income 
of the secondary earner.   
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Taxes, Transfers and Redistribution 
This subsection examines how inequality indices vary for post-tax-and-transfer 
incomes, compared with the inequality of GTI.  The measures used are the Gini, 
Atkinson, Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky indices described in Section 3. These 
have been constructed for different units of analysis. Table 3 shows three cases: 
using individual incomes, household incomes and income per adult-equivalent 
person. Using the household as the unit of analysis recognises that, with income 
sharing within households, it may be more appropriate to consider inequality in the 
distribution of income between households. The ‘household income’ inequality 
measures in Table 3 are estimated across individuals but where each adult within the 
household is assumed to receive an equal share of household income.
18
 
The use of household income per adult-equivalent person further recognises that 
sharing economies may depend on household composition and size - where there 
are several adults and/or children within a household. For example, adding a second 
or third adult to a household, and the inclusion of children may provide differing 
opportunities to share income. A number of adult equivalence scales are used in the 
literature, many of which can be captured by the simple form: 
 
α θ ) ( c a n n m + =  (13) 
where m is the number of adult-equivalents, 0 ≤ θ ≤1 captures the weight attached to 
each additional child in the household, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 captures scale economies. 
Table 3 adopts a commonly used scale in NZ Treasury’s tax projections – the 
‘Jensen scale’, which approximately equates to θ = 0.7; α = 0.6.
19
 Sensitivity to this 
scale is examined below. 
A feature of the inequality indices reported below is that in all cases these relate to 
inequality across individuals where, in the case of ‘household income’ and ‘adult-
equivalent household income’, the income is assumed to be shared equally among 
the adult household members, or the adult-equivalents as measured by (13). For 
example, consider a two-adult household with a household income of $50,000. With 
no weighting, the household is considered to have two adults with $25,000 each. 
Alternatively, using an adult equivalence scale such as (na + θnc)
α with α = 0.6, there 
are 2
0.6 = 1.516 adult-equivalents in the household yielding 2 individuals each with an 
adult-equivalent income of $32,988. 
Table 3 reports inequality measures using the following abbreviations: Y = gross 
taxable income; T = tax; W = income after tax; S = transfers; Z = income after tax and 
transfers; g = ratio of tax to income. In discussing the results, the focus is mainly on 
                                                  
18
  More precisely, since we report incomes of those aged 15 years and over, we also allocate 
household incomes within the HES across this group. Hence ‘household-based’ inequality indices in 
Table 3 are calculated across individuals (aged ≥ 15 years) within households where each 
household member is allocated 1/nh of the household income, where nh is the number of household 
members ≥ 15 years. 
19
  See Creedy and Sleeman (2006, chapter 9) for discussion and comparison of many adult 
equivalence scales.   
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the indices for incomes per adult-equivalent, as other results reveal a similar pattern. 
Inequality of gross taxable income, using either GY or AY, is generally lower for 
comparisons across households than across individuals, with the use of the adult-
equivalence scale reducing inequality further. This is not surprising since inequality 
indices based on household incomes effectively remove intra-household inequality. 
Using an adult-equivalence scale gives relatively higher income to individuals within 
larger households compared to weighting all adults equally. Hence the use of an 
adult equivalence scale improves inequality (compared to no scaling) if households 
on lower incomes tend to have lower ‘adult equivalents’ – either due to fewer 
additional adults or a higher ratio of children to adults.
20
 
Table 3 – Inequality Measures for Incomes, Taxes and Transfers 
 
Inequality measure 
Based on distribution across individuals using: 




Gini (G) & Concentration (C) Indices: 
GY  0.464 0.407 0.391 
CW 0.432  0.381  0.363 
CZ 0.406  0.352  0.333 
CT  0.565 0.490 0.479 
CS  0.362 0.304 0.489 
Atkinson Index:  AY A Y A Y       [AZ] 
A (ε = 0.2)   0.077  0.057  0.052   [0.038] 
A (ε = 0.5)  0.190  0.139  0.128   [0.094] 
A (ε = 0.8)  0.305  0.221  0.202   [0.149] 
A (ε = 1.0)  0.392  0.277  0.252   [0.187] 
A (ε = 1.5)  0.730  0.492  0.453   [0.291] 
Kakwani (K) and Reynolds-Smolensky (L) Progressivity Indices: 
KW  0.101 0.083 0.088 
KZ 0.218  0.213  0.216 
LW  0.032 0.025 0.027 
LZ 0.052  0.050  0.055 
Tax ratios:  g (tax) = 0.238 
  g (tax - transfers) = 0.212 
Considering the Gini and Concentration indices in Table 3 it can be seen that the tax 
system modestly reduces inequality from GY = 0.391 to CW = 0.363, with transfers 
inducing a further reduction to CZ = 0.333. The CT and CS indices also reveal the 
redistributive nature of taxes and transfers since these exceed the value of GY = 
0.391; for a proportional tax the concentration curve coincides with the Lorenz curve, 
                                                  
20
  Analysis of adult-equivalents using TaxWell confirms that these tend to be lower for lower income 
households, leading to higher adult-equivalent incomes within these households; see Appendix.   
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such that GY = CT. Note that this does not apply to transfers since if these are 
progressive the concentration curve for transfers (unlike the Lorenz curve) lies above 
the 45
o line; the more progressive are transfers, the further above the 45
o line is their 
concentration curve, and hence larger CS.
21
 
Table 3 shows that, when considering the distribution across adult-equivalent 
household incomes, taxes and transfers (essentially WfF) are similarly redistributive: 
CT = 0.479, CS = 0.489. However, across individuals or households, transfers are 
noticeably less redistributive than taxes. This likely reflects the fact that, since WfF is 
related to child numbers and ages, it has a greater impact when these are given 
greater weight via the adult equivalence scale. However, across individuals, because 




The L indices of tax and transfer progressivity in Table 3 (where L = GY – GZ) show 
that the gross income Gini is reduced by about 2.5 points (0.027) by the tax system 
and by a similar further amount by WfF. The same message emerges from the 
Kakwani, K, indices measuring the concentration of tax (or tax & transfers) relative to 
gross incomes. Tax can be seen to be more concentrated (relative to a proportional 
tax) by almost 9 points (0.088) and taxes and transfers by over 20 points (0.22). The 
Atkinson indices in Table 3 also confirm that the inequality across individuals using 
income per adult-equivalent is less than for individual incomes or household 
incomes. For example, AY (ε = 0.5) falls from 0.19 for individual incomes to 0.13 for 
adult-equivalent incomes. AZ (ε = 0.5) is noticeably lower at 0.094. 
The Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky measures of progressivity and redistribution 
are all Gini-based and thus related to Lorenz and concentration curves. These are 
illustrated in Figure 3, where all curves are based on adult-equivalent incomes. The 
Lorenz curve of post-tax-and-transfer income is closer to the line of equality than that 
of post-income-tax income, which in turn is closer to the line of equality than that of 
gross income. Figure 3 also shows the concentration curve for tax payments. This 
lies substantially outside the various Lorenz curves, reflecting the disproportionality 
(progressivity) of personal taxes. Adding transfers (not shown) would magnify the 






                                                  
21
  In this case the concentration index measures the area between the concentration curve and the 45
o 
line, as a share of the total area above the 45
o line. 
22
  According to HES data, WfF affects about 65 per cent of families with children but only about 20 per 
cent of all families.   
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The inequality indices for New Zealand in Table 3 may be compared with similar 
measures estimated for Australia. For example Creedy and Kalb (2006) estimate 
Atkinson indices for ‘net income’ (post-tax-and-transfer income), for 1997/98, similar 
to those in Table 3. For an adult-equivalence scale with α = 0.6 (close to the value 
used in Table 3) they obtain AZ(ε = 0.5) ≈ 0.07. Creedy et al (2008) provide estimates 
for 2003/04; they estimate GZ = 0.285, AZ(ε = 0.2) = 0.027, and AZ(ε = 0.5) ≈ 0.06.
23
 
These values compare to our New Zealand estimates of GZ = 0.336, AZ(ε = 0.2) = 
0.043 and AZ(ε = 0.5)  = 0.108. Though differences in income definitions, equivalence 
scales etc make cross-country comparisons tricky, these measures tend to suggest 
that net incomes are more equally distributed in Australia than New Zealand.
24
 
Sensitivity to Adult Equivalence Scales 
The differences across columns in Table 3 suggest that the adult equivalence scale 
can be important in drawing a number of inequality conclusions. This subsection 
therefore considers sensitivity of the Gini and Atkinson indices to the particular scale 
adopted. Figure 4 shows the two indices for a range of values of α (the scale 
parameter) and three values of θ (the ‘number of children’ parameter): 0.4, 0.6 and 
0.8. The profiles reveal a relatively ‘flat’ range around α = 0.6 - 0.7 where there is 
little sensitivity to the precise α value selected, but much more sensitivity at low 
                                                  
23
  The AZ(ε = 0.5) value is inferred from other estimates. 
24
  Zhang and Formby (2003) and Formby et al. (2003) report comparable US evidence. Based on tax 
return data for individuals in 1995, Zhang and Formby report: Gy = 0.52; GW = 0.48; K = 0.21; L = 
0.035. Using family income data for 1996, Formby et al (2003) report lower values: Gy = 0.36; GW = 
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values of α. Sensitivity to θ is greatest at higher α values: raising θ from 0.4 to 0.8, 
when α = 0.8, increases the Gini of gross income by around 0.01. To put this in 
perspective, the tax and transfer system as a whole reduces the concentration of 
gross income by around 0.06 (GY – CZ in Table 3, column 4). With commonly used 
values of α around 0.6-0.8, it is not perhaps surprising that, for income per adult-
equivalent, inequality measures are relatively sensitive to changes in θ in Figure 4. 










Redistributional Impact of Alternative Tax-Transfer 
Policies 
This subsection reports the distributional impact of changes in a number of tax-
transfer parameters. One issue of interest is, if a government wishes to maintain 
constant inequality, or achieve the maximum reduction in inequality for a given fiscal 
cost, which reforms best deliver those outcomes? Table 4 shows the Gini and 
Concentration indices of post-tax-and-transfer income under the 2006-07 system 
(using income per adult-equivalent person), for which GZ = 0.335; CZ = 0.332.
25
 
Tax change scenario 1.1 in the table shows that an increase in the top MTR to 0.42 
costs around -$360m (i.e. it raises revenue) and reduces CZ by 0.003. This is more 
than reversed by raising the top rate threshold from $60k to $100k (see 1.2). 
However, comparing (1.2) and (1.3) shows that if the top threshold is first raised to 
$100k (CZ = 0.335), raising the top MTR to 0.42 then achieves negligible 
redistribution (-0.001). Alternatives 2, 3 and 4 show the impact of raising the other tax 
rates (0.33 to 0.36 or 0.21 to 0.22) at similar fiscal revenue gain, and raising the 
lowest rate of 0.15, to 0.17 (at slightly greater revenue gain). It can be seen that all 
three have minimal effect on the two inequality indices. On the other hand, raising the 
                                                  
25
  This analysis uses the simpler adult equivalence scale: α = 0.6, θ = 0.7. Similar results are obtained 
using a simpler inequality measure that focuses on the ratio of average income for the top 80% of 
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main WfF rates by 20 per cent (with a fiscal cost of $680m) has a greater impact than 
raising the top MTR to 0.42. 
Table 4 – Inequality Effects of Tax and Transfer Changes 
No.  Tax change scenario  GZ  CZ  Fiscal cost, $m 
  Status Quo: GY = 0.390  0.335  0.332   
1.1  39% rate to 42%  0.332  0.329  -356 
1.2  39% rate to 42% & threshold: 60K to 100K  0.336  0.334   239 
1.3  39% threshold: 60K to 100K only  0.338  0.335   397 
2.  33% rate to 36%  0.333  0.331  -351 
3.  21% rate  to 22%  0.335  0.332  -367 
4.  15% rate  to 17%  0.336  0.333  -432 
5.  FTC+IWTC levels raised by 20%  0.331  0.327   680 
 
Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
This section examines the range of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) associated 
with the NZ tax-transfer structure and considers the number and types of taxpayer 
subject to those rates. While these cannot identify efficiency costs, they can indicate 
where some of the incentives to adapt behaviour in response to existing or reformed 
tax levels are greatest.
26
 To illustrate, Figures 5 and 6 show EMTRs and EATRs for 
secondary earners in a family with two children aged 5 and 3 years. Figure 5 shows 
EMTRs for secondary earners deciding to work an additional day per week (0 to 1 
day; 1 to 2 days, 2 to 3 days, etc) based on an hourly rate of $15 per hour, where the 
primary earner is earning 67, 100 and 150 per cent of the average wage. The chart 
shows the EMTR associated with working an extra day per week: from 0 to 1; 1 to 2 
and so on. 
                                                  
26
  Measurement of the efficiency effects of direct taxes, paying attention to population heterogeneity 
and the wide range of behavioural responses, requires the use of a behavioural tax microsimulation 
model, such as the Australian MITTS model; see Creedy et al. (2002) and Creedy and Kalb (2006).   
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It can be seen that secondary EMTRs are typically between 35 and 41 per cent 
except where the primary earner is relatively highly paid or low paid. In the former 
case WfF has fully abated when the secondary earner works 4 days at the $15 wage 
rate. In the latter case, the combined income of the primary and secondary earner 
exceeds the WfF abatement threshold only when the secondary earner is working 1 
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Figure 6 shows EATRs for primary and secondary earners. These are likely to be 
more relevant than EMTRs for secondary non-earners considering entering the 
labour market. The Figure reveals that though average tax rates for primary earners 
are negative until he or she earns around the average wage, for secondary earners 
EATRs are typically in the 30-40 per cent range, depending on primary earners’ 
wages. 
Of course, the significance of these tax rates depends, in part, on the numbers of 
taxpayers for whom they are relevant. Figure 7 shows EMTRs affecting significant 
numbers of taxpayers, based on an analysis of HES data using TaxWell. These 
EMTRs represent the sum of the effective marginal income tax rate, the abatement of 
WfF (20 per cent), and the ACC levy (1.3 per cent). They do not include benefit 
abatement such as for unemployment. These data should be interpreted with 
caution; for example, the EMTRs shown for non-earners represent TaxWell 
assumptions regarding the wage that a non-earner would face should he or she 
decide to enter employment. The large numbers on an EMTR of 16.3 per cent reflect 
TaxWell’s assumption (which is unrealistic for many people) that those individuals 
would face the minimum wage if working. 

















Despite this, some non-earners face an EMTR of 36.3 per cent because of WfF 
abatement. The addition of secondary to primary (and other) income is sufficient to 
cause WfF to abate.
27
 Of particular interest is the fact that many of those facing lower 
EMTRs are beneficiaries or superannuitants, while many primary and secondary 
earners face EMTRs of 39 per cent or more. The data suggest that almost 40 per 
cent of primary earners (and over 20 per cent of secondary earners) face EMTRs of 
                                                  
27
  Where relevant, TaxWell implicitly assumes that WfF abates against primary earnings first and 
abates against secondary earnings only where primary earnings are insufficient.   
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39 per cent or more, even though the statutory 39 per cent tax rate affects only 
around 13 per cent of all earners. 
The Composition of Low Income Taxpayers 
This section examines individuals with low taxable incomes. One reason why this is 
likely to be of particular interest to governments is that those on low incomes are 
often targeted by tax policy aimed at reducing inequality or poverty. For example, 
New Zealand is unusual among OECD countries in taxing individuals’ incomes from 
the first dollar rather than allowing an initial tax-free zone. By exempting low incomes 
from tax, such a zone is often presumed to reduce inequality. However, the analysis 
below suggests that, at least for New Zealand, it would probably be a poorly targeted 
instrument. 
The analysis first identifies those individuals where low income is unlikely to indicate 
low economic welfare and/or their income is insensitive to tax policy changes (Group 
A). For the remainder (Group B), low incomes are likely to be a better indicator of 
economic wellbeing and are potentially affected by tax changes. The analysis 
suggests that the vast majority of individuals with low taxable income fall into Group 
A. This group can be further decomposed as follows: 
A1.  Disposable income is insensitive to tax changes at low income levels (for 
example, post-tax income is determined by a legislative formula); 
A2.  Low income individuals benefit from the income of others, or taxable income 
is quite different from an ‘economic income’ measure (for example, 
membership of a higher income household); 
A3.  Low taxable income is short-term only (for example, students). 
Analysis of individuals 
This subsection focuses on the 1.4 million individuals with taxable income below 
$18,000 per annum This is just below the income from working 30 hours per week at 
the minimum wage of $18,720. These low income individuals are allocated to one of 
eleven mutually exclusive categories based on key characteristics. Each category is 
then assessed to consider the extent to which low taxable income is likely to reflect 
low economic wellbeing and whether tax policy is a good redistributive instrument. 
It would appear that up to 90 per cent could be characterised as those who receive 
social welfare payments and are therefore unaffected or less affected by tax design 
at low income levels (superannuitants and beneficiaries), or those relying on other 
economic or disposable income (self-employed, recipients of working for families, 
many secondary earners and 15-17 year olds) or those likely to have temporarily low 
taxable income (18-24 year olds and students). As in previous sections, Taxwell is 
applied to 2006/07 HES data to analyse information on income sources for each 
individual (for example, wages and salaries, self-employment) as well as their family   
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 The eleven mutually exclusive categories to which 
individuals were allocated – to help identify whether they belong in Groups A or B 
above – are outlined below. The categories were selected sequentially from 1 to 11, 
with individuals allocated to categories in the order shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 – Allocating Low Income Individuals to Groups 
Category (all with taxable income < $18,000)  All or most in 
this Group 
Some in this 
Group 
1.   New Zealand Superannuation  A1   
2.   Core benefit recipient  A1   
3.   Self employed  A2  B 
4.   Aged 15-17  A2   
5.   Student  A3  A2 
6.   Secondary earner; family with taxable income 
more than $50,000 
A2  
7.   Family eligible for working for families tax 
credits 
A2  
8.   Aged 18-24 (excludes students)  A3  B 
9.   Majority of income is from non-taxable sources  A2  B 
10. Secondary earner; family with taxable income 
less than $50,000 
B A3 
11. Primary earner:  B  A3 
 
Further details of the above eleven categories are as follows.  
1. New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) is the major source of income. Tax changes 
at low incomes affect NZS in the short term only. In the medium term - between 1 to 
3 years - tax changes at the average wage have the greatest impact on net NZS as a 
result of the legislative formula that involves annual CPI adjustments and requires the 
net married couple rate to be between 65 - 72.5 per cent of net ordinary-time weekly 
average earnings.
29
 (Group A1) 
2. Core benefit is the major source of income:  Net-of-tax benefit rates are set in 
legislation. This means that tax changes which reduce tax paid on benefit income are 
                                                  
28
  Data limitations mean that some income sources could not be identified and were treated as non-
taxable, while some taxpayers had very low incomes, including zero, that were difficult to explain. 
Our conclusions are not sensitive to those limitations. 
29
  For the December 2007 quarter (the basis for the 1 April 2008 adjustment to NZS rates) ordinary-
time weekly average earnings were $861.55, or $44,800 per annum.   
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compensated by an equivalent change in gross benefit payments to leave after-tax 
benefit payments unchanged. (Group A1) 
3. Self employment is the major source of income: While reported taxable income 
from self employment might be low (and tax payable minimal), economic income will 
in many cases be much higher (e.g. business profits retained within a company, or 
losses used to offset personal income etc). Low taxable income may also be 
temporary.
30
 Some self-employed will however experience low economic wellbeing 
associated with their low taxable income.  (Most Group A2; some Group B).  
4. Aged 15-17:  Economic wellbeing for most 15-17 year olds is dependent on their 
parents’ income.  (Group A2). 
5. Students: Students are most likely to have temporarily low income as they forego 
market income while engaged in study. Other policy instruments, rather than tax 
changes, provide better targeting to increase student income, such as increasing 
levels of student allowance and changes to student loan policy. (Most Group A3; 
possibly some Group A2). 
6. Secondary earner in a family with taxable income greater than $50,000: Although 
family income of $50,000 might not be considered high, a secondary earner in such a 
family would enjoy higher economic wellbeing than suggested by their low taxable 
income. (Group A2).  
7. The family is eligible for working for families tax credits: Families with low taxable 
income that receive working for families may pay little or negative amounts of tax.  
Individuals within this group do not receive benefits as a main income source but 
have family income of less than $50,000.  While disposable income might be low, 
economic wellbeing can be increased through more targeted policy levers. (Group 
A2). 
8. Aged 18-24: Low taxable income might be temporary for many, either reflecting 
recent entry into the workforce (i.e. part way through a year) or an expectation of 
higher future earnings.  For some however low incomes will not be temporary and 
may reflect low economic wellbeing. (Most Group A3; some Group B). 
9. Majority of income is from non-taxable sources: While taxable income is low, the 
majority of income is derived from other sources.  In many cases this other income 
may be taxable but data limitations prevent it being classified as such.
31
 (Most Group 
A2; some Group B). 
10. Secondary earner in a family with taxable income less than $50,000: Individuals 
in this category are more likely to suffer low economic wellbeing associated with their 
                                                  
30
  Inland Revenue data suggests that up to 40% of taxpayers with self employment as their main 
source of taxable income and who earned less than $18,000 in 2001, earned more than this amount 
in 2006. 
31
  The HES records a number of income types that we cannot distinguish and therefore cannot treat as 
taxable income. Examples include irregular income and some overseas pensions.  It might be the 
case that such income is taxed. However, our results are not sensitive to the classification of this 
category which represents only 1-2% of the low income taxpayers.   
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low taxable income. They do not have children (so are not eligible for WfF) and are 
unlikely to be in full-time work. (Most Group B; some Group A3). 
11.  Primary earners: These individuals are most likely to face low economic 
wellbeing associated with low taxable income. They derive a majority of income from 
sources other than benefit, NZS and self-employment, and are not members of 
higher income households. Almost all individuals in this category with taxable income 
below $10,000 worked full-time (30 or more hours per week) for less than 6 months, 
with many not working at all. However, individuals entering the workforce (or country) 
part way through the year may fall within this category so low taxable income may be 
temporary, arising in the current survey period only.
32
 (Most Group B; some Group 
A3). 
The proportions of individuals with low taxable income within each category are 
shown in Figure 8: the category numbers shown (1 to 11) are those listed above. 
Hence group A1, comprising categories 1 and 2, form 39 per cent of taxpayers with 
income below $18,000 per year. Group A2, made up of categories 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9, 
form 19 per cent; and categories 5 and 8 which make up group A3, form 31 per cent.  
Thus group B, comprising mainly categories 10 and 11, represents only up to 11 per 
cent - or around 164,000 individuals - where low taxable income may represent low 
economic wellbeing and tax may be an effective redistributive instrument. This 
number most likely represents an upper bound however, since individuals entering 
the workforce part of the way through the year would have low income for the survey 
period although many would subsequently be in full-time work. Also some individuals 
could be temporarily out of the workforce at the time of the survey; indeed a large 
proportion of those in category 11 worked for only a small part of the year. 
Conversely, some individuals within other categories, such as the self-employed and 
18-24 year-olds, may face low economic wellbeing as a result of low taxable income. 
Unfortunately the data do not allow these groups to be decomposed further. 
Therefore, while around 11 per cent of individuals falling within Group B might benefit 
especially from a tax cut on low incomes such as a tax-free zone compared to other 
policy options, for nearly 90 per cent of individuals earning less than $18,000 a tax-
free zone would be poorly targeted. This is consistent with the conclusions of the 




                                                  
32
  For example, consider a new migrant who has only been in New Zealand for six months prior to the 
HES survey being completed. While the migrant may have been in full-time work for those six 
months, their taxable income at the time of the survey will appear low. 
33
   The Tax Review (2001, p. 60) concluded: ‘Given that income is a poor indicator of need, proposals 
for a tax-free zone poorly target those in need and have large fiscal costs. These fiscal costs would 
raise marginal tax rates for most taxpayers.’ 
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Figure 8 – Composition of Individuals with Incomes Below $18,000 p.a. 
1. Superannuitant
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Analysis by Household 
Having examined the characteristics of low-income individuals, it is also of interest to 
consider the extent to which the taxable incomes of heads of households might be 
considered a good measure of economic wellbeing. As with the analysis of 
individuals, if there are many heads of households for whom low taxable income may 
not reflect low economic wellbeing, income tax may be a poorly targeted 
redistributive instrument. This includes those receiving the majority of income from 
NZS, Core Benefit or from self-employment income; heads of households under 23 
years or in receipt of student allowances; and those receiving a majority of their 
income from non-taxable sources. Remaining heads of household are those deriving 
income predominantly from wages and salaries, and would thus benefit most from 
reforms to income tax rates and thresholds. 
Figure 9 shows the frequency distribution histogram of household heads at different 
taxable income levels. The ‘lighter’ bar component shows the numbers for whom it is 
estimated that taxable income is a good measure of economic wellbeing. That is, it 
excludes only those in receipt of income from NZS, Core Benefits, and so on (as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph). The large majority of heads of household, up 
to 650,000, earn between $20,000 and $70,000. For most of them, and those higher 
up the income scale, taxable incomes are generally a good measure of economic 
income.  
By contrast, there are perhaps only about 60,000 heads of households with taxable 
incomes below $20,000 for whom this is a reasonable measure of their economic 
income. Personal income tax reforms, such as a tax-free zone, seeking to increase 
low household incomes would therefore be poorly targeted at this income range, and 
to a lesser extent, for those up to $30,000. Rather, most households affected would 
be in the $30,000 – $70,000 range.   
WP 08/04  |  EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY MEASURES OF TAX-TRANSFER 
SYSTEMS: SOME EVIDENCE FOR NEW ZEALAND 
26 
 








































The paper has sought to make two contributions to the analysis of the equity and 
efficiency effects of tax policy in New Zealand. Firstly, it considered the available 
methodologies to measure tax redistribution and efficiency and has applied these to 
the New Zealand income tax and transfer system using Household Economic Survey 
data for 2006-07 and the Treasury microsimulation model, TaxWell. This is a non-
behavioural model, and hence conclusions must be treated cautiously. Nevertheless 
it provides some information on the likely ‘impact’ effects of tax-transfer policy, and 
illustrates how using equity and efficiency measures of the impacts of taxes and 
social transfers can assist with the design and evaluation of income tax and transfer 
policy. 
The Gini measure of inequality of gross (taxable) income was found to be 0.391 
using adult-equivalent incomes as the unit of analysis. The tax and transfer system 
produces a distribution of post-tax-and-transfer income with a Gini that is lower by 
around 0.06 in absolute terms, or a 15 per cent reduction. In terms of the abbreviated 
social welfare function associated with the Gini measure, this is equivalent to a 9.5 
per cent increase in arithmetic mean income. This would appear to result in a less 
equal distribution than is observed in Australia. It is important to recognise that these 
inequality measures require value judgements by the policy-maker or evaluator 
regarding their aversion to inequality as well as their view regarding the measure of 
wellbeing, or the welfare metric, to be used (including the choice of income unit and 
equivalent adult scales). 
On the efficiency side, measures of tax efficiency tend to be either comprehensive, in 
allowing for the effects of distortions to behaviour, but difficult to calculate in practice 
(for example, excess burdens), or simple but partial and hence should be interpreted 
cautiously (for example EMTRs, which give an indication of one aspect of the   
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incentives facing individuals in making their labour supply decisions). The analysis of 
effective tax rates for New Zealand suggested that disincentive effects may be 
relatively high for large fractions of primary and secondary earners, though further 
analysis would require the use of a behavioural model. 
Finally, the paper has examined the characteristics of low-income taxpayers in 
New Zealand. A decomposition by individual and household characteristics shows 
that different low income taxpayers are likely to be affected quite differently by 
various aspects of the tax/transfer system. To help those most in economic need, 
tax-free zones appear less suited than positive initial tax rates or more targeted 
welfare measures.   
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Appendix: Adult-Equivalence Scales 
This appendix shows the distribution of adult-equivalents across income bands within 
the distribution of household incomes. The adult equivalence scale used in the 
analysis in this paper was explained in sub-section 4.3, and is summarised by 
equation (13). Differences in household composition between higher and lower 
income households can give rise to differences in inequality measures when these 
are estimated with or without the use of an adult equivalence scale. For example, if 
lower income households tend systematically to have lower adult equivalents – 
because they have fewer adults and/or more children (who both receive a lower 
weight in the scale) – their adult-equivalent incomes will appear higher than they 
appear to be when measured without an adult-equivalence adjustment. 
Figure 10 below shows adult-equivalents, averaged within ($1000) household income 
bands, estimated from 2006-07 HES data. These are calculated using the ‘Jensen 
scale’ described in sub-section 4.3. This reveals that lower income households do 
indeed tend to have lower adult-equivalents. As a result some of the inequality 
observed in per-adult household incomes can be expected to be reduced when 
inequality indices based on adult-equivalent incomes are used. 
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